Tulsa Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 1 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: One Hundred
Years Later
Fall 2002

Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections
on the Paradoxical State of American Indian Law
Bryan H. Wildenthal

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bryan H. Wildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical
State of American Indian Law, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 113 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss1/22

This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Wildenthal: Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflection

FIGHTING THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY:
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY REFLECTIONS
ON THE PARADOXICAL STATE OF
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW@
Bryan H. Wildenthal*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. 1999:

THREE CASES, THREE COURTS, THREE SOVEREIGNS .............

113

THE LONE W OLF M ENTALITY ..............................................................

118

III.

THE H UNTING OF LONE W OLF .............................................................

123

IV.

THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY RISES AGAIN:
THE REHNOUIST ERA OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW ...........................

124

II.

V. 2001: Two
VI.

WHERE

I.

CASES, ONE COURT, NO JUSTICE ......................................

Do WE GO FROM

1999:

HERE? ........................

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

135
144

THREE CASES, THREE COURTS, THREE SOVEREIGNS

In 1999, as the turn of the twenty-first century loomed, I planned to write a
reflective essay on the state of American Indian law, a field in which I have been
privileged to teach (but mostly, learn) since 1996.' I thought I would use as my

© 2002 Bryan H. Wildenthal.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law and Social Justice, Thomas Jefferson
School of Law, San Diego, Cal. A.B., 1986, J.D., 1989, Stanford University. See <http://bryanbhw.
home.netcom.com/bryan.html>. I can be reached by email at <bryanw@tjsl.edu>.
1. Not because it necessarily should matter (though things like race, nationality, gender, and sexual
orientation do still matter in our society), but because people are sometimes curious about such things,
I would add that I am a non-Indian by any meaningful measure: a mishmash of German, English,
Scottish, Irish, and Hungarian. Yet appropriately enough, as I taught my Indian law course for the
third time in the spring of 2001, one of my aunts discovered in her genealogical researches that my
maternal grandfather was one-sixteenth Cherokee, meaning that I and my genetic siblings have onesixty-fourth Cherokee blood. Teaching and writing in this field as a non-Indian has both challenges
and advantages, but I'll get into that in some other article. I'm also gay, which may be the last thing
anyone reading this article cares about, but I mention it because part of my fascination with Indian law
and cultures has to do with the far more subtle and accepting manner in which many such cultures have
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take-off point three very intriguing decisions rendered that year by courts
representing each of the three sovereign types of government in the United States:
federal, tribal, and state.2 There seemed to be grounds for optimism for those
(like me) who generally support American Indian sovereignty.
The United States Supreme Court, on March 24, 1999, strikingly reaffirmed
(albeit by the narrowest of margins) Indian treaty rights and the traditionally proIndian canons of treaty construction, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa Indians.3 The Navajo Nation Supreme Court, on May 11, 1999, handed
down, in Means v. Chinle District Court,4 what is probably the most important and

interesting tribal court opinion ever.

And the California Supreme Court, on

August 23, 1999, decided Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
InternationalUnion v. Davis, 5 which by the law of unintended consequences may

have given the biggest boost of the three to Indian sovereignty.
It was a promising year for Indian nations in other ways, too. President Bill
Clinton, on July. 7, 1999, visited the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in South

Dakota to promote and discuss a housing and economic empowerment initiative
with tribal leaders.6 He was the first United States President ever to visit Indian
country on official government-to-government business. And he was the first
president to set foot in Indian country for any purpose since Franklin D.
Roosevelt.7 This culminated the friendliest presidential administration in United

States history toward the sovereign rights of Indian nations. Clinton held a 1994
summit meeting at the White House for Indian leaders from across the country 8
and issued several landmark orders promoting Indian rights. 9

traditionally embraced diversity in gender and sexuality. See e.g. Walter L. Williams, The Spirit and the
Flesh: Sexual Diversity in American Indian Culture (Beacon Press 1986); Will Roscoe, The Zuni ManWoman (U. N.M. Press 1991); Will Roscoe, Changing Ones: Third and Fourth Genders in Native North
America (St. Martin's Press 1998).
2. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in an address to the Ninth Indian Sovereignty Symposium, noted
that "[tIoday, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign entities-the Federal government,
the States, and the Indian tribes. Each of the three sovereigns has its own judicial system, and each
plays an important role in the administration of justice in this country." Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor,
Remarks, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 Tulsa L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (Indian
Sovereignty Symposium, Tulsa, Okla., June 4,1996).
3. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
4. 7 Navajo Rptr. 382 (Navajo 1999) (available at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/courtrules
.html>).
5. 981 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1999).
6. Jackie Barone, President Clinton Illuminates the Need for Investment in Native American
Communities, 24 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 503 (2000); Remarks by President Clinton to the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation Community, July 7, 1999, 24 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 505 (2000) [hereinafter Remarks by
President Clinton].
7. See Barone, supra n. 6, at 503; Remarks by President Clinton, supra n. 6, at 506.
8. Ann Devroy & Tom Kenworthy, High Council with "First Americans"; More Than 300 Leaders
of Indian Tribes Gather at White House, Washington Post Al (Apr. 30, 1994); PresidentClinton Meets
with Native American Tribal Leaders, The White House South Lawn, Fed. News Serv. (Apr. 29, 1994);
Remarks by President Clinton During Meeting With Native American Tribal Leaders, The White House
South Lawn, Fed. News Serv. (Apr. 29, 1994).
9. See Memorandum, Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (Apr. 29, 1994); Exec. Or. 13007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26771 (May 24, 1996)
(protecting Indian sacred sites); Exec. Or. 13084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27655 (May 14, 1998) (promoting
consultation with Indian tribal governments); Documents of United States Indian Policy 343-47, 357-58,
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I will come back to the Mille Lacs and Means cases in Part IV of this article.
They are an important part of the story of the continuing, malignant influence of
what I would term the Lone Wolf mentality on today's United States Supreme
Court led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist-although Mille Lacs and Means
both stood in valiant opposition to that mentality. Since Davis is probably more
obscure to most readers (even to many of my fellow Indian law specialists, at least
those outside California), let me expound a bit here on why I think it is so
interesting and important. 10

It is not that the theory or specific holding of Davis were anything to cheer
about. The six-to-one majority found Proposition 5-by which California voters
on November 3, 1998 endorsed expanded Indian gambling-invalid on rather
technical grounds under the state constitution."1 But Justice Joyce L. Kennard's

brilliant dissent12 was a joy to read and signaled a heartening new trend: state
court judges who actually know and appreciate American Indian law.
Furthermore, the people of California signed on enthusiastically to her dissent less
than seven months later, nullifying Davis by state constitutional amendment, as if
to say to their high court, "What part of our sixty-three to thirty-seven percent
vote on Proposition 5 didn't you understand?" The new California-Tribal Gaming
Compact approved by Proposition 1A on March 7, 200013-by a margin of sixty-

five to thirty-five percent this time, thank you very much-was negotiated by the
new, more Indian-friendly governor, Gray Davis, who swept into office along with
Proposition 5 in 1998.

Proposition 1A allows an even broader range of tribal

361-63 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed., U. Neb. Press 2000). Some would argue that Clinton's policies
were more symbolism than substance; for example, one of his first budget decisions was to slash
funding for the Indian Health Service. See e.g. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Clinton's Address to
Native Americans, Congressional Press Releases (Apr. 29, 1994).
10. By the way, I especially hope this article will have some interest and value to lawyers and
academics not well-versed (if at all) in the peculiarities of Indian law. So I would ask my colleagues
specializing in the field to forgive any rehashing of basic points that will be obvious to them. Let's also
get a terminology issue out of the way on which there is a surprising lack of awareness. While "Native
American" is viewed as more "politically correct" by most non-Indians, "American Indian" (or just
plain "Indian") is actually far more used and preferred by Indians themselves. Some Indians actually
find "Native American" offensive because of what they view as its assimilationist or colonialist
overtones. See generally Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the GenocidalAct of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15
Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 107, 168 (1999). Most tend to view it with tolerant bemusement as a term
probably invented by guilty liberal European-Americans. See e.g. John P. LaVelle, Strengthening
Tribal Sovereignty through Indian Participationin American Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, 10
Kan. J. L. & Public Policy 533, 535 (2001). I cheerfully use both terms, but mainly "Indian" (while
offering these and other terminology caveats), in my forthcoming book that is nevertheless titled
Native American Sovereignty on Trial: A Handbook with Cases, Laws, and Documents (ABC-CLIO
forthcoming 2003) because of the publisher's preference and to help distinguish it from David E.
Wilkins' American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (U. Tex.
Press 1997). Personally, I have always found "tribe" and "tribal" much more troubling (with their
somewhat condescending or pejorative implications), but they are such convenient and widely used
terms (again, including by Indians themselves) that I yield to general practice, while also often using
the more preferable term "nation."
11. Davis, 981 P.2d at 1002-09. For an excellent survey of California Indian gambling issues leading
up to Proposition 5, see Guy Levy, Student Author, Western Telcon v. California State Lottery: Will
Native Americans Lose Again?, 19 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 361 (1997).
12. Davis, 981 P.2d at 1011-19 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
13. Dan Morain & Tom Gorman, Campaign 2000 Propositions,L.A. Times Al (Mar. 8, 2000).
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casino gambling than Proposition 5 would have. California tribes, including those
near my hometown of San Diego, are in the midst of a social and economic
revolution as a result.1 4 It's an exciting time and place to be in this field.
The problem the Davis majority could not get past was that in 1984, when
California voters authorized the state lottery, they also amended the California
Constitution to prohibit any state legislation "authoriz[ing] ... casinos of the type
currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey., 15 Proposition 5, as a mere
statutory initiative, could not override the Lottery Amendment.1 6 Justice Kennard
brilliantly, and correctly, sidestepped that problem by arguing that Proposition 5
did not, properly understood, "authorize" Indian gambling at all as a matter of
state law, in the sense prohibited by the Lottery Amendment. 7 Rather, Kennard
framed the issue of Indian gambling
in its proper historical context, as an aspect of
18
inherent Indian sovereignty.
Although, as Justice Kennard conceded, Proposition 5 itself purported to
"authorize" the casino gambling that would have been allowed under its
provisions, it was simply part of a broader framework of federal law: specifically,
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA") and its recognition of the
ancestral Indian power to govern Indian lands.'9 True, IGRA delegates to the
states considerable influence to "shape the contours of the federal
authorization., 20 But the ultimate "authorization" for any Indian gambling flows
from federal law and Indian sovereignty. The Lottery Amendment can only
logically and properly apply to state legislation within the state's own sovereignty
and jurisdiction.
It should be noted that federal judges had already, by 1998, gutted IGRA of
much of its practical force. Congress' obvious intent in IGRA was to force states
to negotiate with Indian tribes over forms of gambling that the states did not
already authorize, as long as such states did not have a categorical public policy
criminalizing all high-stakes gambling. But the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held, in a bizarrely erroneous decision in 1995, that IGRA
did "not require a state to negotiate over one form of... gaming activity simply

14. See Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary of Interior for Indian Affairs, Notice of Approved TribalState Compacts, 65 Fed. Reg. 31189 (May 16, 2000), corrected, 65 Fed. Reg. 34726 (May 31, 2000);
California-Tribal Gaming Compact <http://www.cfk.com/final%20compact.htm> (accessed Nov. 8,
2002); State Propositions, S.F. Chronicle A26 (Nov. 5, 1998); State Propositions, S.F. Chronicle A8
(Mar. 9, 2000); Andrew Pollack, Las Vegas Glitz Is Set to Go West; Tribes in California Scramble to
Expand Casinos after Vote, N.Y. Times C1 (Mar. 10, 2000); Chet Barfield, Sycuan Band Purchases
Country Club, San Diego Union-Tribune B7 (May 26, 2001); Jack Katzanek, Casinos Help Build
Inland Work Force: Economy: American Indian Tribes Already Employ Thousands and Are Adding
Jobs, The Press-Enterprise (Riverside, Cal.) Al (Feb. 24, 2002); James P. Sweeney, State OKs More
Slots for Indian Casinos, San Diego Union-Tribune Al (June 20, 2002).
15. Davis, 981 P.2d at 994 (quoting Cal. Const. art. IV, § 19(e)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1014-15.
18. See id. at 1012-14 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1015 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see Cal. v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721 (2000)).
20. Davis, 981 P.2d at 1014 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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because it has legalized another, albeit similar form of gaming., 21 The effect was
to subject Indian nations to the precise scope of gambling regulation dictated by
state law. Judge William C. Canby, Jr., by far the most knowledgeable judge on
the federal bench when it comes to Indian law,22 protested in vain that "[t]his
ruling effectively frustrates IGRA's entire plan., 23 But the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in this case in 1997,24 having ruled five-to-four the year before that, in
any event, Indian tribes could not sue states to enforce IGRA.25
As Justice Kennard stated in Davis, "it is utterly beyond the sovereign power
of California to authorize or prohibit gambling on Indian lands within the state.
California can no more authorize gambling on Indian lands than it can authorize
gambling in another state., 26 As she tellingly noted, California had "entered into
a compact with... Nevada... regulating the number and size of gaming facilities
located in Nevada within the Lake Tahoe basin., 27 But no one has ever seriously
suggested that this compact "authorizes" casinos in violation of the Lottery
Amendment. The Davis majority did not really respond to, or even seem to
28
understand, the points Kennard made. In any event, as noted above, the ironic
result of the Davis majority's obtuseness was to open the door even wider to
Indian gambling in California.
That was the way things looked in 1999. I got distracted by other projects
and never had time to write that reflective essay. In 2002, when I was invited to
contribute to this symposium issue of the Tulsa Law Review, marking (though
decidedly not "celebrating," I think) the centennial of the United States Supreme
Court's infamous decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,29 things looked very
different. A more accurate insight, it now seems, might be drawn from the title of
a 1999 essay by Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo (Din6) Nation: "Watch
Your Six."3° We were rudely awakened, as the twenty-first century dawned, by
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hicks,31 which reminded

21. Rumsey Indian Rancheria v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1995), amended on denial of
reh'g, 99 F.3d 321 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. See William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell (3d ed., West 1998); Alan A.
Matheson, Catherine Gage O'Grady & Judith M. Dworkin, Judge William C. Canby, Jr.: A Tribute, 33
Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2001).
23. Rumsey, 64 F.3d at 1253 (Canby, J., joined by Pregerson, Reinhardt & Hawkins, JJ., dissenting
from denial of en banc rehearing). Senior Judges Ferguson and Norris also agreed with Canby. Id. at
1255.
24. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).
25. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
26. Davis, 981 P.2d at 1014 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1015 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 1003 n. 2 (responding to the central argument of Kennard's dissent only in a brief,
obtuse footnote).
29. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
30. Robert Yazzie, "Watch Your Six": An Indian Nation Judge's View of 25 Years of Indian Law,
Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 23 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 497 (1999). For those who are not fans
of aerial dogfight movies, "watch your six" is military slang referring to the six o'clock position, i.e.,
directly behind you, where an unseen enemy may have you in his sights. See id. at 497.
31. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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us that the Lone Wolf mentality is alive and well on today's Rehnquist Court. But
all in due course. First, a little history.
II.

THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY

In seizing the reins from their temporizing leaders on the issue of Indian
gambling, the people of California, in the resounding referenda of 1998 and 2000,
made a moving effort to atone for the holocaust perpetrated on California Indians
during the nineteenth century. That disturbing chapter of history, about which
most Californians would prefer not to think, has been recounted elsewhere and
should be told more widely. I cannot do it justice here. It is part of the broader
story of genocide and dispossession perpetrated on American Indians during the
era that produced Lone Wolf. The scholar C. Blue Clark has effectively
summarized "how bad it really was" during those years, especially from California
statehood in 1850 to the inauguration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in
1933.32

A great deal has been written about Lone Wolf (and this symposium adds
still more). I am not sure I have anything new to say about the case itself. The
Lone Wolf Court not only confirmed the United States Government's so-called
"plenary" power to abrogate Indian treaties and generally regulate Indian
affairs,33 it declined to exercise any meaningful judicial review over the treatment
of the Indians.34 The decision upheld the flagrant expropriation of the reservation
(in what is now Oklahoma) guaranteed by an 1867 treaty to the Kiowa,
Comanche, and Apache Indians. 35 The process by which the government
"negotiated" this taking in 1892, and by which Congress legislatively decreed it in
1900, stank to high heaven. And it was all too typical of that era. The 1892
''agreement" was not endorsed by three-fourths of the adult male tribal members,
as it fraudulently purported to be and as the treaty required. Those tribal
members who did endorse it were misled as to its terms, which Congress altered
anyway. The Senate made a half-hearted attempt to inquire into these
shenanigans, but the House of Representatives buried the agreement in a bill with
an unrelated title and thereby snuck it past the Senate into law.36
The Lone Wolf Court at least betrayed signs of a guilty conscience. Justice
(future Chief Justice) Edward D. White's opinion for himself and seven of his
colleagues (including the newly appointed Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.)
begged that since "Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary
cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this
legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as

32. C. Blue Clark, How Bad It Really Was before World War II: Sovereignty, 23 Okla. City U. L.

Rev. 175 (1998). Clark cites to the essential sources, for those desiring to further explore this chapter
of our history.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 563-64, 568.
Id. at 556.
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implying,... relief must be sought by an appeal to [Congress] .... Justice John
38
Marshall Harlan the elder, who dissented so famously in Plessy v. Ferguson3 -

and less famously but no less angrily in an 1884 case finding even detribalized
Indians racially unfit for United States citizenship39-did not do so here. But he
apparently could not bear to sign White's opinion, concurring only in the result
without further explanation. 40
Lone Wolf was not a huge departure from prior cases, though it reflected a
downhill trend. Even Chief Justice John Marshall's great opinion in Worcester v.
Georgia,4' upholding the sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation against the
aggression of Georgia,42 was built on the supremacy of federal congressional
power over relations with the Indians. 43 Decisions in 1846 and 1886 upheld everbolder assertions of federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian nations. 44 Lone Wolf
was specifically foreshadowed by the Cherokee Tobacco45 case of 1871, which
upheld Congress' power to abrogate a treaty-based tribal tax immunity. But at
least Cherokee Tobacco stirred a powerful dissent. Justice Joseph P. Bradley
(joined by Justice David Davis) relied on the canons of construction to argue that46
Congress had not expressly indicated an intent to override tribal sovereignty.
Furthermore, Bradley protested that the case "depends on a solemn47 treaty.., in
which the good faith of the [United States] government is involved.,
The downhill slide continued even into the otherwise progressive Court led
by Chief Justice Earl Warren. In 1955, in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States4"
(less famous but more shocking than Lone Wolf itself), the Court brazenly
endorsed one of the most outrageous and unconstitutional assertions of federal
power in the history of American law. Tee-Hit-Ton is certainly well-known to
Indian law scholars, but I have the sense that it is not nearly as well-known as it
should be to legal scholars or the public generally. Even more than Lone Wolf, it

37. Id. at 568.
38. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896).
39. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110-23 (1884) (Harlan, J., joined by Woods, J., dissenting). For
more discussion of Harlan's exceptional role in defending constitutional liberties on the Court during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see generally Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to
Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporationof the Bill of Rights, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 1457 (2000). On his
career generally, see Linda Przybyszewski, The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan (U. N.C.
Press 1999).
40. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
41. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
42. Id. at 561-62.
43. Id. at 559; Nell Jessup Newton, FederalPower over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195, 202 (1984).
44. See U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846); U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Newton, supra n. 43,
at 209-16.
45. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1871).
46. See id. at 622-23 (Bradley, J., joined by Davis, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 623 (Bradley, J., joined by Davis, J., dissenting). It was a fairly close, four-to-two decision,
since Chief Justice Chase and Justices Nelson and Field did not participate. See id. at 624.
48. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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5 °
truly ranks with Dred Scott,49 Plessy v. Ferguson,
and Korematsu v. United
51
States in the Supreme Court's hall of shame.
The facts of Tee-Hit-Ton were quite simple. The United States Government
cut and sold timber for its own benefit from lands claimed by the Tee-Hit-Ton
band of Tlingit Indians in Alaska. 52 The Tee-Hit-Ton claimed, at a minimum,
aboriginal or "Indian title" to these lands. That is, they and their "tribal
predecessors ha[d] continually claimed, occupied and used the land from time
immemorial;.., when Russia took Alaska, the Tlingits had a well-developed
social order which included a concept of property ownership;... [and] Russia
while it possessed Alaska in no manner interfered with their claims to the

land .... The Court conceded that if "Congress by treaty [or statute] or other

agreement ha[d] declared that thereafter [the] Indians were to hold the lands
permanently, compensation must be paid for subsequent taking." 54 But without
such "recognition"55 of the Indian title, even assuming its unbroken historical roots
as claimed by the Tee-Hit-Ton,16 they had merely "a right of occupancy which ...

may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of... without any legally
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians."57 This was indeed, even more
than Lone Wolf itself, the Dred Scott of Indian land rights: They had none at all
that European-Americans were obliged, ab initio, to respect! They enjoyed
only
''18
"recognize.
to
deign
might
Government
States
United
the
such rights as
There are few constitutional rights which the Court has protected as
zealously as "private property" and the right of "just compensation" whenever it is
"taken" by the government "for public use." 59 Numerous cases before, between,
and after Lone Wolf and Tee-Hit-Ton have held that even partial or temporary
takings, and even some regulations that merely restrict the most profitable
possible uses of property, are entitled to constitutional compensation. 60 But not
"Indian title," according to Tee-Hit-Ton. Not the Indians' aboriginal rights to
property that they held for uncounted generations before Europeans even arrived
on the scene. This went considerably further than Lone Wolf, where the Court at
least cowered behind the fiction that the taking there was perhaps "a mere change

49. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The Dred Scott Court treated slave ownership as a
fundamental property right, id. at 459-62, and denied eligibility of even free African-Americans for
United States citizenship and constitutional rights. Id. at 427.
50. 163 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1896) (upholding state-enforced racial segregation).
51. 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding race-based relocation of Japanese-American United States
citizens and legal residents during World War II).
52. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273.
53. Id. at 277.
54. Id. at 277-78.
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 277.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Id. at 275. Cf.Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (holding that African-Americans had "no rights which the
white man was bound to respect").
59. U.S. Const. amend. V.
60. See e.g. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, ConstitutionalLaw 480-97 (14th ed., Found.
Press 2001).
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in the form of investment of Indian tribal property. '61 And since Lone Wolf did
involve "recognition" (by treaty) of the Indian land rights at stake there, it did not
present the ultimate issue decided by Tee-Hit-Ton.
The Tee-Hit-Ton Court claimed support for its holding in Chief Justice
Marshall's definition of the "Indian title" concept in Johnson v. McIntosh.62 But
that foundational 1823 case merely required deciding to whom Indians could
legally convey their title. 63 A priority rule was needed to resolve the supposed
title dispute between the non-Indian parties to the case. Johnson held title
originating in grants by Indian tribes to private land speculators, 64 and McIntosh
held title based on grants by the United States Government, which had in turn
65
obtained the land from the tribes. Marshall held that Indian tribes could convey
full legal title only to the conquering European-American sovereign: the British
Crown before 1776 and the United States Government afterward. 66 So McIntosh
won. 67
The "Discovery Doctrine" on which Marshall relied is certainly
indefensible on any ground other than "might makes right." Marshall himself
ridiculed it both in Johnson and nine years later in Worcester.68 But with a
regretful, positivist shrug of the shoulders, Marshall simply noted in69 Johnson:
"Conquest gives a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny.,
But Marshall was never forced to decide the ultimate issue resolved in TeeHit-Ton. He held that Indian nations lost full sovereignty and the power to
dispose of their lands as a result of the European-American conquest. He
conceded the power of the United States to extinguish Indian title. But he never
held that the United States was or should be free to do so without any legal
consequences. To the contrary, Marshall asserted that "the exclusive power to
extinguish that right [of Indian occupancy], was vested in that government which
might constitutionally exercise it."7 0° He added that even though "[t]he title by
conquest is acquired and maintained by force[,] ... humanity demands, and a wise
policy requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain

61. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568; see Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by
Calling it a Mere Change in the Form of Investment, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 37 (2002).
62. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 277 (citing Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823)).
63. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 571.
64. Id. at 550-54, 560.

65. Id. at 560.
66. Id. at 588-89.
67. See id. at 571-605. Recent scholarship has found that many of the long-assumed background
facts of Johnson v. McIntosh are questionable, and that the underlying dispute was probably feigned.
See e.g. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1065, 1073, 1081-93 (2000).
68. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591 (noting the "extravagant... pretension of converting the discovery
of an inhabited country into conquest," and that this was "opposed to natural right, and to the usages
of civilized nations"); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543 (asking sardonically: "Did these [European]
adventurers, by sailing along the coast, and occasionally landing on it, acquire for the several
governments to whom they belonged... a rightful property in the soil, from the Atlantic to the Pacific;
or rightful dominion over the numerous people who occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator
of all things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and manufacturers?").
69. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
70. Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
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unimpaired., 71 What "humanity" and "a wise policy" require of any conqueror,
the Constitution surely requires of the United States!
A legal realist would point to footnote seventeen of the Tee-Hit-Ton opinion
as the most important support for the holding. The Court there noted the
government's contention "that if aboriginal Indian title was compensable...,
there were claims with estimated interest already pending... aggregating
$9,000,000,000.''72 The Court concluded its opinion with a boldness and crudity in
remarkable contrast to the embarrassed buck-passing of Lone Wolf Here we see
the Lone Wolf mentality on open display, again even more so than in Lone Wolf
itself: "[T]he savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges
by force and.., even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return
for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that
deprived them of their land."73 It simply would not "meet the problem of the
growth of the United States" if the Court were to do something so radical as "to
subject the Government to an obligation to pay" for Indian lands.74
"Our conclusion," claimed the Court with truly nauseating arrogance and
hypocrisy, "does not uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians,
but it leaves with Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for the
termination of Indian occupancy of Government-owned land rather than making
compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle. 7 5 In other words, the
Indians should shut up and be grateful for whatever "gratuities" the government
might afford them in exchange for the privilege of remaining on their ancestral
lands, defined by the Court's own ipse dixit as "Government-owned"! And darn
that Bill of Rights with its inconveniently "rigid" (and costly!) principles!
It is thus the Warren Court that must take full responsibility for resolving in
Tee-Hit-Ton the question left open by Chief Justice Marshall 132 years before.
The Court could not properly hide behind him, or even behind Lone Wolf. That
the Court decided Tee-Hit-Ton less than a year after it effectively overruled
Plessy76 only compounds the irony. Chief Justice Warren himself, it should be
noted (along with Justice Felix Frankfurter), joined Justice William 0. Douglas'
dissent in Tee-Hit-Ton. But the dissenters did not challenge the majority's basic
premise. They merely found that Congress had in fact "recognized" the Indians'
title, in an 1884 statute organizing the territory of Alaska.77 Justice Hugo L. Black,
a notable defender of Indian rights in other cases (as discussed in Part III below),
joined silently with the majority. Such was the power of the Lone Wolf mentality.

71. Id. at 589.
72. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 285 n. 17.
73. Id. at 289-90.
74. Id. at 290.
75. Id. at 290-91.
76. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
77. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 294-95 (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J. & Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
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III.

THE HUNTING OF LONE WOLF

By 1959, however, it seemed that a new day was dawning on the United
States Supreme Court. Justice Black wrote the unanimous opinion in Williams v.
Lee," strongly reaffirming the historic presumption in favor of Indian
sovereignty.7 9 This revitalization of the most pro-Indian aspects of Chief Justice
Marshall's Worcester opinion came at a critical time. Congress and the President,
in one of the many twists and turns of federal Indian policy, had turned on Indian
sovereignty with a vengeance in 1953, promoting the termination of Indian
governments and granting several states (including California) wide jurisdiction
over Indian country.80 The 1955 Tee-Hit-Ton decision might well have heralded
judicial endorsement of this trend. Instead, over the next quarter century or so,
the Court, more often than not, fought back against the Lone Wolf mentality.
For reasons of space, I will dwell on only one example of that post-Williams
trend. In United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,"' an eight-to-one majority of

the Supreme Court upheld the Sioux claim that the United States Government's
1877 seizure of the Black Hills of South Dakota violated the 1868 Treaty of Fort
Laramie and triggered the constitutional right of compensation under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. Of greatest interest is that Justice Harry A.
Blackmun's majority opinion, while not overruling Lone Wolf, rejected- much of
its reasoning. In particular, the Court held that Lone Wolfs extreme deference
toward supposed "congressional good faith[,] ... based in large measure on the
idea that relations between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political matter,
not amenable to judicial review[,] ...has long since been discredited.

,82

In

place of the Lone Wolf mentality, Blackmun declared that in analyzing a claim of
"engage in a thoroughgoing and
governmental taking of Indian land, courts should
83
record.
historical
the
of
impartial examination
But lest we make too much of Sioux Nation, it is well to remember that the

Court was only able to hear such cases at all because Congress waived the
government's sovereign immunity in the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 4
and with regard to the Sioux claim in particular, because Congress passed a special
law in 1978 allowing the merits of that claim to be reconsidered. 5 Sioux Nation
did not question the Tee-Hit-Ton rule that "'unrecognized' or 'aboriginal' Indian
title is not compensable under the Fifth Amendment. 8 6 Takings of such
aboriginal land rights were potentially compensable under the 1946 law if

78. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
79. Id. at 222.
80. See H.R. Con. Res. 108 (1953) (reprinted in 67 Stat. B132 (1953)); Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588 (1953) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
81. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
82. Id. at 413.
83. Id. at 416.
84. Id. at 384-90; see Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (formerly codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 70-70n, 70o-70v (omitted 1978)).
85. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 384-85; Pub. L. No. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978).
86. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415 n. 29 (citing Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 285).
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accomplished by "unfair and dishonorable dealing," but only without interest on
the value originally taken. 81
IV.

THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY RISES AGAIN:

THE REHNQUIST ERA OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW

While it seemed that Sioux Nation might be closing in for the kill, the Lone
Wolf mentality has, unfortunately, survived and prospered. Indeed, one has only
to turn to the lone dissent in Sioux Nation, by Justice Rehnquist, 8 to see an
example of the mentality that has come to dominate the Supreme Court.
Rehnquist would be promoted by President Reagan to lead the pack as Chief
Justice six years after Sioux Nation, and he had already made his mark two years
before, in writing the majority opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe89
(on which more anon). Sioux Nation gave him a chance to vent his feelings
unhindered by the need to speak for a majority.
Rehnquist disagreed quite bluntly with Blackmun's examination of the
historical record in Sioux Nation. "There were undoubtedly greed, cupidity, and
other less-than-admirable tactics employed by the Government during the Black
Hills episode in the settlement of the West," Rehnquist conceded, "but the
Indians did not lack their share of villainy either." 90 One would have to agree, of
course, that theft is a "less-than-admirable tactic." As the renowned Indian
scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. noted, Rehnquist's "outburst can be translated for the lay
person as 'sure we stole the Black Hills. But, the Indians beat their wives and so
that makes us even."' 9'

Rehnquist ventured on from the weird to the paranoid, accusing the majority
of basing its decision on the views of "'revisionist' historians" who were "writing
for the purpose of having their conclusions or observations inserted in the reports
of congressional committees. ,92 Well, Rehnquist has me there. One of my sisters
is a historian, 93 and you know, every time I turn around she's trying to mislead
some congressional committee. As Blackmun pointed out, however, the "primary
sources" for the history the majority relied on were "the factual findings of the
Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims. A reviewing court generally
will not discard such findings because they raise the specter of creeping
revisionism, as the dissent would have it, but ... only when they are clearly
erroneous and unsupported by the record. 9 4 Not even the United States

87. See id. at 387; Canby, supra n. 22, at 352-57. The 1946 law did not apply to the claim in Tee-HitTon. See Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273-74.
88. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (rejecting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
90. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. Vine Deloria, Jr., Laws Founded in Justice and Humanity: Reflections on the Content and
Characterof FederalIndian Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 203, 216 (1989).
92. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. See e.g. Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884-1945 (Duke U. Press 2001).
94. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 421 n. 32.
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Government contended that the factual findings "fail[ed] to meet that standard of
review." 95
Rehnquist concluded by citing "the cultural differences" of plains Indians
like the Sioux that "made conflict and brutal warfare inevitable." The Indians, he
said (quoting historian Samuel Eliot Morison), "lived only for the day, recognized
no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if they thought they could get away
with it, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching."96
Well.
Could "culture" alone account for such childlike, even animalistic,
depravity? Did Indians really "live only for the day," caring not about yesterday
or tomorrow, about their ancestors or the future welfare of their children and
grandchildren? The testimony of actual Indians casts doubt on Morison's casual
generalization, adopted by Rehnquist. Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce, speaking
on behalf of his tribe in the late nineteenth century, recalled his father's dying
words:
"When I am gone, think of your country.... You must stop your ears whenever you
are asked to sign a treaty selling your home.... This country holds your father's
body. Never sell the bones of your father and mother." I pressed my father's hand
and told him I would protect his grave with my life. My father smiled and passed
away to the spirit-land.
I buried him in that beautiful [Wallowa] valley of winding waters. I love that land
more than all the rest of the world. A man who would not love his father's grave is
worse than a wild animal....
I have heard talk and talk, but nothing is done. Good words do not last long unless
they amount to something. Words do not pay for my dead people. They do not pay
for my country, now overrun by white men.... Good words will not get my people
97
a home where they can live in peace and take care of themselves ....
Rehnquist's view of the Black Hills episode specifically (as opposed to his
stereotypical slurs on Indian character generally) was not based on any historical
scholarship. He failed to cite a single historian in that regard, relying instead on a
1942 Court of Claims decision. But as Blackmun noted, that court's findings were
not before the Supreme Court in 1980 and were, in any event, "based largely on
[Lone Wolf s] conclusive presumption of good faith [by Congress] toward the
9
Blackmun suggested that Rehnquist's view amounted to "an
Indians ....
article of faith."9 9 Deloria argued that it revealed his "personal emotional
preference." 1°° In any event, it reflected the Lone Wolf mentality in undiluted
form.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 436-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of
the American People 540 (Oxford U. Press 1965)).
97. Coyote Was Going There: Indian Literature of the Oregon Country 38 (Jarold Ramsey ed., U.
Wash. Press 1977).
98. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 422 n. 32.
99. Id.
100. Deloria, supra n. 91, at 217.
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In Oliphant, Rehnquist spoke for a six-to-two majority holding that Indian
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians unless Congress expressly grants
them such power.01 This reversed the historic presumption of Worcester and
Williams that Indian sovereign powers survive until and unless expressly revoked

by Congress. Rehnquist placed great weight on a single historical instance in
which an Indian tribe requested that Congress grant it such power. As he argued,
this might imply by default that tribes were otherwise generally understood to lack
such power.' °2 But Rehnquist buried in a lengthy footnote a great deal of
countervailing evidence, whose significance he distorted or disregarded.0 3
The most revealing part of Rehnquist's Oliphant opinion argued that
inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was simply inconsistent with
dependent tribal status. He maintained that the tribes "necessarily g[a]ve up their
power to try non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner
acceptable to Congress."' 4 He cited the Bill of Rights and the "great solicitude"
101. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195-96, 212. Cf id. at 212 (Brennan, J., not participating); id.
(Marshall, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority in a brief statement
citing the Ninth Circuit decision that was appealed to the Court). I am, of course, far from being the
first scholar to analyze Oliphant. Compare Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson,
The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 609
(1979) (strongly criticizing Oliphant),and Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of FederalIndian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L.
Rev. 219, 265-74 (same) with Richard B. Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes, 54 Wash L. Rev. 479 (1979) (agreeing with much of Oliphant's reasoning while criticizing some
aspects).
102. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 197-98.
103. Id. at 197 n. 8. For example, Rehnquist conceded that numerous early treaties with Indian
tribes expressly removed from them the power to punish non-Indian wrongdoers, typically promising
instead that such criminals would be "punished according to the laws of the United States." Id. He
insisted that "these provisions were not necessary to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
from the Indian tribes," but "served an important function ... by clarifying jurisdictional limits of the
Indian tribes." Id. But why were such provisions so "important" to "clarify" tribal power, if the
background understanding was as Rehnquist insisted? They were certainly important if the presumed
alternative was that tribes did have such power. Rehnquist took special note of the Treaty of Fort Pitt
with the Delaware Nation of 1778 (the very first treaty ever entered into between the United States
and an Indian nation), which he asserted was the only one that "ever provided for any form of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (other than in the illegal-settler context [which Rehnquist had
earlier discussed])." Id. Oddly, Rehnquist seemed to think this supported his overall argument. But
as his own description of the relevant treaty provision made clear, it was not so much an authorization
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians as a limitation on such jurisdiction. The treaty prohibited either
the United States or the Delaware tribe from punishing the other's citizens except by a "fair and
impartial trial" according to procedures "to be hereafter fixed" by the Continental Congress in
consultation with the Delaware Nation. Id.; Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation (Sept. 17,
1778), 7 Stat. 13. This no more suggested that the Delaware tribe lacked inherent criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians than it implied the United States lacked inherent criminal jurisdiction over Indians!
As Rehnquist noted, there was little or no actual historical practice of non-Indians being criminally
prosecuted, in a formal sense, by Indian tribes. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 196-97. But of course, there was
little or no historical practice of Indian tribes formally prosecuting anyone, even their own citizens,
until the modern development of tribal courts. See e.g. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, American
Indians, American Justice 111-25 (U. Tex. Press 1983). Yet Indian tribes always exercised the power to
deal in some fashion with violent or antisocial acts by their own members, and history does not suggest
that they were shy or reluctant to deal with violent or antisocial non-Indian intruders. See e.g. id. at 8099. The treaty provisions Rehnquist himself discussed provided clear recognition of that. The
particular means or methods by which a sovereign enforces its laws or social norms might well change
over time, but that has little relevance to the existence or non-existence of inherent sovereign power
itself.
104. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 210.
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the United States has always had "that its citizens be protected.., from
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."'' 5 The Court has long held that
the Bill of Rights does not directly apply to tribal governments, since they were
not parties to the Constitution and they and their powers predate its existence.' °6
As Rehnquist conceded, Congress statutorily applied most of the Bill of Rights to
the tribes in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ("ICRA"). 17 One might argue
that shows Congress is sensitive to concerns about the quality of tribal justice and
has already imposed the safeguards it thinks necessary to protect United States
citizens. It actually supports by implication the presumption that tribes otherwise
enjoy the inherent power to criminally prosecute anyone coming within their
lands. 108
Rehnquist, never known as a staunch defender of the rights of criminal
defendants, did not explain why such concerns had any logical relevance to the
issue of Indian jurisdiction-any more than concerns about the quality of justice
in, say, Chinese courts have any relevance to China's inherent and presumptive
criminal jurisdiction over United States and other foreign citizens visiting there.
Furthermore, to the extent concerns may exist about the personal liberties of
United States citizens under tribal court jurisdiction, why should there be any
greater concern for criminal defendants who happen to be non-Indian as opposed
to Indian? Rehnquist ignored the fact that Indians are United States citizens! He
implicitly conceded throughout his opinion that Indian citizens fall properly within
tribal criminal jurisdiction, yet he suggested no concern whatsoever for their rights
and liberties in that regard.
One might argue, of course, that Indians have chosen to maintain and submit
to the ancestral sovereignty of their nations, and thus are not in a position to
complain about any risks that poses to their rights and liberties. But by the same
token, non-Indians who choose to enter or reside on an Indian reservation and
commit crimes there also have no grounds to complain about being subjected to
tribal court jurisdiction. That is the standard rule of implied consent when
foreigners enter the United States, when Americans travel abroad, or when
residents of one state cross state lines into another. It is the rule when Indians
leave Indian country. One might argue that Indians who live on reservations
deserve greater concern than non-Indians in this regard. Such Indians can only
escape tribal criminal jurisdiction by uprooting themselves from their homelands
and moving elsewhere. Non-Indians concerned about possibly unfair treatment

105. Id.
106. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
107. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 13011341 (2000)). ICRA also imposed a cap on the criminal punishments that Indian tribes may impose
even on their own members; the maximum allowed punishment for any given offense is currently one
year in prison and a $5,000 fine. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
108. Rehnquist pointed in particular to a provision of Suquamish tribal law excluding non-Indians
(who constituted the overwhelming majority of residents of the tribe's Port Madison reservation) from
service on tribal court juries. See Oliphant,435 U.S. at 193 n. 1, 193-94. But if that provision were ever
specifically litigated (which Oliphant made unnecessary), it would probably be struck down as a
violation of ICRA's equal protection guarantee. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
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by tribal courts must merely choose not to reside in or enter Indian country in the
first place.
Rehnquist's unexplained favoritism toward non-Indians and disdain for the
rights and interests of Indians was dramatized most clearly by his illogical attempt
to draw an analogy between his reasoning in Oliphant and the 1883 Kan-Gi-ShunCa (Crow Dog) case." 9 In Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca, the Supreme Court ruled that federal
courts outside Indian country lacked jurisdiction over a crime committed by one
Indian against another on tribal land."° Congress quickly overturned the decision
by enacting the Major Crimes Act of 1885,"' which the Court promptly upheld in
United States v. Kagama.12 Rehnquist claimed that Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca presented
"almost the inverse of the issue" in Oliphant."' If the Suquamish Indian Tribe had
reached out to prosecute a non-Indian for a crime committed against another nonIndian outside the Suquamish reservation, Rehnquist's analogy might have made
sense. But in fact, defendant Oliphant was arrested for assaulting a tribal police
officer on the reservation, and his co-defendant, another non-Indian named
Belgarde, was charged with a reckless joyride along reservation roads that ended
in a collision with a tribal police car."'
Twelve years after Oliphant, in Duro v. Reina,1 15 the Court confronted the
predictable follow-up issue: If tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
what about Indians who are not members of the prosecuting tribe? Instead of
reconsidering its error in Oliphant, the Court dug itself in deeper. Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy spoke for a seven-to-two majority that included now Chief
Justice Rehnquist. Only Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, dissented."' Kennedy's Duro opinion betrayed an even
shakier grasp of history than Rehnquist's in Oliphant. Kennedy claimed that the
historical record on tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was "less
illuminating" than in Oliphant and "tend[ed] to support" rejection of such
jurisdiction." 7 In fact, as Brennan pointed out in dissent, the evidence is far
stronger and clearer, and plainly supports such jurisdiction.1 8 It has been common
throughout American history for Indians to settle or mingle with Indians of other
tribes, often because of deliberate United States Government policies relocating
different tribes together on artificially created reservations. There has never been
federal jurisdiction over minor crimes between Indians in Indian country. Major
crimes only came under federal jurisdiction in 1885, as noted above. Nor has state
jurisdiction ever existed over any such crimes, except since 1953 in the handful of

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ex parte Kan-Gi-Shun-Ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
Id. at 572.
Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)).
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
See id. at 194.
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
See id. at 698-710 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 688.
See id. at 698-706 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss1/22

16

Wildenthal: Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflection
2002]

FIGHTING THE LONE WOLF MENTALITY

states covered by Public Law 280."' So how did tribes handle such crimes by
nonmember Indians during all those years? Kennedy didn't have a clue.
As to how such crimes would be handled in the future, given the
jurisdictional void created by Duro, Kennedy offered several weak proposals that
simply underscored his ignorance of Indian law and Indian country. His most
astonishing and offensive suggestion was that state criminal jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 might be expanded. 12 The vast majority of Indians have never
been subject to Public Law 280, which has been intensely unpopular with both
states and tribes (in the few states where it applies) ever since it was passed at the
height of the Termination Era. States have resented the costs of criminal
jurisdiction over territories and peoples not otherwise subject to state taxation,
and tribes have resented the consequent loss of sovereignty and intrusion by nonIndian state authorities into their affairs. The inadequacies of Public Law 280
have led to endemic lawlessness in many parts of Indian country.12' Congress,
showing considerable impatience with the Court's inept meddling, almost
1 22
immediately reversed Duro (by a statute commonly known as the Duro Fix Act)
and purported to restore to Indian nations their inherent sovereignty over
nonmember Indians.
And yet, there was a certain logic to Kennedy's Duro opinion, and I fear we
have not seen the last of it. If one first accepts Oliphant as a given (and the Court
has shown no inclination to overrule it), then the question becomes whether a
distinction is justifiable between tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers who
are Indians of other tribes and nonmembers who are non-Indians. While
Rehnquist in Oliphant seemed to find unimportant the fact that Indians are now
United States citizens, Kennedy emphasized it. He refused to "adopt a view of
tribal sovereignty that would single out another group of citizens, nonmember
Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not include them. ' 1 23 Would such
treatment amount to racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause? That clause does not directly apply to Indian nations, but Congress
statutorily applied equal protection principles to them via ICRA. Furthermore,
constitutional equal protection principles do apply to Congress itself,124 which
enacted the Duro Fix Act.
It is, of course, the most ludicrous of ironies to see Oliphant extended in the
name of avoiding racial discrimination. Indian nations have never sought to
"single out" anyone, either non-Indians or nonmember Indians or anyone else, for
criminal jurisdiction. They have simply sought to do what all sovereign

119. 67 Stat. 588 (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360); see Canby,
supra n. 22, at 168.
120. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 697.
121. See e.g. Canby, supra n. 22, at 217; Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem
of Lawlessness in CaliforniaIndian Country, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1405 (1997).
122. Indian Civil Rights Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1856 (1990), Pub. L. No.
102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)).
123. Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
124. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).,
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governments traditionally do: apply their laws to everyone entering their
jurisdictions.

It was the Court's own decisions in Oliphant and Duro that, to

borrow Kennedy's words, "singled out" certain "groups," first non-Indians and
then nonmember Indians, for special immunity from inherent tribal criminal
jurisdiction. While Rehnquist in Oliphantexpressed concern for the rights of nonIndian United States citizens in tribal courts, and Kennedy in Duro expressed
concern for nonmember Indian United States citizens, they both ignored the fact
that tribalmember Indians are themselves United States citizens. Neither explained

why, if it is tolerable for any United States citizen to be prosecuted by a tribe, all
United States citizens choosing to reside in or enter Indian country should not be
treated equally.
But the equal protection problem raised by the Duro Fix Act is real, even if
it is a problem of the Court's own creation. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on it. Lower courts have so far generally upheld the fix. 12 5 But I doubt very much
that the Supreme Court will indefinitely tolerate this somewhat halfhearted
attempt by Congress to counteract the Lone Wolf mentality underlying both
Oliphant and Duro. If Congress wants the fix to stick, it had better pass not just a
Duro Fix but an Oliphant Fix.

The Navajo Nation Supreme Court confronted the issues raised by Oliphant
and Duro in Means v. Chinle District Court, 26 which presented a fascinating
collision of Indian sovereignty with one of the most colorful personalities of
modern Indian activism. The question was whether the Navajo (Din6) Nation
could lawfully prosecute Russell Means, a famous Indian rights activist and
member of the Oglala Sioux Nation, for a crime allegedly committed within the
Navajo Nation."' Means claimed that the Navajo Nation lacked criminal
jurisdiction over him, and that any assertion of such jurisdiction would, in any
event, violate his equal protection rights, since (under Oliphant) he would not be
subject to Navajo jurisdiction if he were a non-Indian. 2 8 Chief Justice Yazzie's
crafty opinion tried to sidestep the Duro issue. Disdaining any reliance on the
Duro Fix Act, he turned first to the Navajo-United States Treaty of Fort Sumner
of 1868129 to support Navajo criminal jurisdiction over any nonmember Indians
settling in the Navajo Nation.130 And indeed, the text and historical background of
the treaty strongly supported such a conclusion. Article 2 of the treaty expressly
set aside the Navajo reservation "for the use and occupation of the Navajo... and
for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time to time they may
be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit among them ...

,,31

125. See e.g. U.S. v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 925 (2002).
Enas, however, did not address an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the Duro Fix Act, but rather a
Double Jeopardy Clause issue.
126. 7 Navajo Rptr. 382 (1999) (available at <http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/courtrules.html>).
127. Id. at 384.
128. See id. at 383.
129. Treaty of Fort Sumner, New Mexico with the Navajo Nation art. 2 (June 1, 1868), 15 Stat. 667.
130. Means, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 388-91.
131. 15 Stat. at 668.
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Yazzie further concluded that Means, by marrying a Navajo woman and
settling within the Navajo Nation, had established himself as a hadane (in-law)
under Navajo common law, thus implicitly consenting to Navajo jurisdiction. This
allowed the court to sidestep Means' equal protection claim on the ground that
any non-Navajo, regardless of race or ethnicity, could become a hadane.3 2 As
legal analysis, this was a bit of a high-wire act. The United States Supreme Court
in Duro had rejected tribal jurisdiction over a male nonmember Indian who had
' tribal member,
lived on a reservation for three months with a "woman friend"133
employment" 134
long
or
marriage
and suggested that even "close ties.., through
would not suffice to subject non-Indians or nonmember Indians to tribal
jurisdiction. Yet Duro also seemed to acknowledge the power of tribal
governments to provide for membership by adoption and intermarriage with tribal
members, citing two cases from the 1800s."3 ' This ambiguity reflects the generally
confused quality of the Duro opinion, surely one of the worst Kennedy has ever
written for the Court. Yazzie's opinion, by contrast, represents an artful effort to
seize the Lone Wolf mentality by the ears. Whether it will work in the long run
remains an open question. Means' challenge to Navajo jurisdiction1 6 is now
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The historical detail and contextual sensitivity of Chief Justice Yazzie's
analysis of Navajo treaty rights in Means found timely support in a decision of the
United States Supreme Court rendered less than two months earlier. This was
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians.137 Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's five-to-four majority opinion in Mille Lacs upheld treaty rights
claimed by the Chippewa to hunt, fish, and gather plants (collectively referred to
as "usufructuary" rights), on lands in Minnesota that they had ceded to the United
States in the Treaty of St. Peter's of 1837. 138 In the process, she resoundingly
reaffirmed the canons of construction supporting preservation of Indian
sovereignty.139 Mille Lacs was very much in the tradition of Worcester and
Williams, and an encouraging blow to the Lone Wolf mentality typified by
Oliphant and Duro. Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented,
joined by
140
Justice Kennedy and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.
The 1837 treaty at issue in Mille Lacs gave the president the power to
terminate at his pleasure the Chippewa treaty rights on the lands ceded by that

132. Means, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 393.
133. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
134. Id. at 695.
135. See id. at 694 (citing U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846); Nofire v. U.S., 164 U.S. 657 (1897)).
136. See Marley Shebala, No Rights for Nonmember Indians, Means Says, Navajo Times (June 13,
2002) (available at <http://thenavajotimes.com/means2.html>).
137. Means, 7 Navajo Rptr. at 389 (citing Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S.
172 (1999)).
138. Treaty of St. Peter's, Wisconsin Territory with the Chippewa art. 5 (July 29, 1837), 7 Stat. 537.
139. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 175-208. Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined O'Connor's majority opinion. Id. at 174.
140. Id. at 208-20. Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissent for himself alone. Id. at 220-26.
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treaty. 14' There was no dispute that the president still has, that power today.
The issue was whether that presidential power had ever been effectively
The Chippewa, in a second treaty concluded in 1842,144 ceded some
exercised.
additional lands to the United States, while continuing to live in the general area.
The 1842 treaty expressly gave the president the power to actually remove the
145
In
Chippewa (again, at his pleasure) from the lands covered by that treaty.
1850, President Zachary Taylor ordered the removal of the Chippewa from the
lands covered by both the 1837 and 1842 treaties, and purported to revoke all their
privileges under both treaties. 4' Because of Chippewa resistance, however, the
removal order was never carried out, and it was abandoned when President
Franklin Pierce took office in 1853.47
O'Connor concluded that the 1850 removal order was invalid with regard to
the lands covered by the 1837 treaty, because that treaty only gave the president
power to revoke the usufructuary rights, not to actually force the removal of the
Indians. 4 8 On the other hand, as Rehnquist pointed out, the 1850 order did
expressly revoke all privileges under both the 1837 and 1842 treaties, and there
was no dispute that the president had the power to wipe out the 1837 usufructuary
rights, even if he could not validly force the Chippewa to actually leave the 1837
lands. Rehnquist also argued that yet another Chippewa-United States Treaty
(concluded in 1855), which ceded still more Chippewa lands to the United States,
independently extinguished the 1837 treaty rights.149 Finally, Rehnquist found the
1837 treaty rights null and void on yet a third ground. Because such usufructuary
rights are typically "temporary and precarious" by nature, they were, he argued,
implicitly abrogated by Congress' admission of Minnesota as a state in 1858. In
support, Rehnquist cited a Supreme Court decision from the Lone Wolf era, Ward
v. Race Horse,5 ° that relied on the theory that Indian treaty rights are generally
inconsistent with a newly admitted state's right to exercise power over all of its
territory on an "equal footing" with other states. 15'
O'Connor meticulously shredded each of Rehnquist's arguments. Closely
examining the history and context of President Taylor's botched effort to remove
the Chippewa, she found that his 1850 removal order had to "stand or fall as a
whole,' 52 and that he never would have intended to abrogate the usufructuary

141. Id. at 177; 7 Stat. at 537.
142. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 189.
143. Id. at 189-90.
144. Treaty of La Pointe, Wisconsin Territory with the Chippewa of the Mississippi and Lake Superior
art. 6 (Oct. 4, 1842), 7 Stat. 591.
145. Id.; see Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 177.
146. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 179.
147. Id. at 181.
148. Id. at 188-90.
149. Id. at 208-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Treaty of Washington, D.C. with the Pillager and
Lake Winnibigoshish Chippewa (Feb. 22, 1855), 10 Stat. 1165.
150. 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
151. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 219-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 191.
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rights guaranteed by the 1837 treaty if he had known the removal order was
invalid and would never be carried out. Thus, the 1850 order could not properly
be construed to abrogate the 1837 treaty rights. 153 O'Connor also strictly applied
the canons of construction to the 1855 treaty. Although the treaty appeared to
relinquish "all" Chippewa rights on "any" lands in Minnesota, the language was
vague and general. 5 4 The focus of the 1855 treaty was on selling lands entirely
separate from those covered by the 1837 treaty. There was no explicit mention of
the 1837 treaty or of usufructuary rights. Nor was there any mention of separate
compensation for any such abrogated rights. 5 5 "These omissions are telling,"
O'Connor noted, "because the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication
and experience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights. 1 5 6 She
went on to again review the historical record in remarkable detail, and with
57
meticulous sensitivity to the Indian perspective.1
As for the abrogation argument based on Minnesota statehood in 1858,
O'Connor correctly found that to be completely contrary to the canons of
construction. 58 Congress made no mention of any Indian treaty rights in the
admission act. Furthermore, the relevant premise of the Race Horse case, on
which Rehnquist relied, had been repudiated and rendered obsolete only nine
years after it was decided. In United States v. Winans,159 a surprisingly pro-Indian
decision just two years after Lone Wolf, the Court had rejected the idea that preexisting treaty rights are presumptively abrogated upon statehood. Relying on
this familiar hornbook principle of Indian law, O'Connor concluded simply:
"Treaty rights are not impliedly terminated upon statehood."' 60 The Mille Lacs
majority did not technically overrule Race Horse, because O'Connor noted it
could be supported on a narrower alternative ground set forth in the 1896 opinion:
that the specific treaty rights at issue there were not intended to survive the
statehood of the particular state involved in that case (Wyoming). 6'
O'Connor's approach in Mille Lacs may signal a return to stricter judicial
adherence to Indian treaty and related land rights. Two years later, by the exact
same vote, the Court in Idaho v. United States 62 upheld the Coeur d'Alene tribe's
title to a lakebed and riverbed, against the argument that Idaho had acquired such
navigable waterbeds upon statehood in 1890.163 Although the Coeur d'Alene
reservation was not created by treaty, but rather by presidential executive order

153. Id. at 188-95.
154. See id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 10 Stat. 1165).
155. Id. at 195; 10 Stat. 1165.
156. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195.
157. See id. at 195-202.
158. See id. at 202-08.
159. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
160. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 207; see Canby, supra n. 22, at 422-24.
161. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 206.
162. 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (opinion of the Court by Souter, J., joined by Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg
& Breyer, JJ.); id. at 281-88 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
163. Id. at 279-80.
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and an agreement ratified by Congress,' 64 the Idaho majority employed the same
65
sensitive canons of construction and historical review that marked Mille Lacs.1
But the five-to-four margin in both the Mille Lacs and Idaho cases is a
reminder of the razor's edge on which Indian rights rest in today's Court. A
careful reading of Rehnquist's Mille Lacs dissent only underscores how
dangerously powerful the Lone Wolf mentality has become. It is astonishing
enough that Rehnquist sought to revive and convert into a general rule of Indian
treaty interpretation an obsolete, century-old decision from the Lone Wolf era.
Rehnquist was taking a position so extreme that it was rejected two years after
Lone Wolf by most of the same Justices who decided Lone Wolf itself! If he was
not beating a dead Race Horse, he was certainly trying to raise it from the dead.
In Rehnquist's hands, it would seem, any Indian treaty rights are by definition
"temporary and precarious"!
Even more startling is how Rehnquist went out of his way to construe
President Taylor's 1850 executive order as properly terminating the Chippewa
treaty rights. He found the rights-terminating and removal portions of the order
severable, so that even if the removal portion was invalid, the treaty rights would
still be nullified. 66 In the process, he rejected the majority's application of the
pro-Indian canons of construction to the executive order. He claimed the canons
applied only to treaty interpretation, and were designed strictly and only to
remedy the unequal bargaining positions of the United States Government and
67
the tribes.

1

Rehnquist cited no authority for this claim, which is simply false. Hornbook
Indian law is expressly to the contrary. 68 Unequal bargaining power is certainly
one primary justification for the canons, and they certainly originated in the
context of treaty interpretation. But the canons have long been applied, perhaps
most famously and importantly, in the context of federal legislation that might or
might not be construed to abrogatetreaty rights. 169 Indian tribes do not "bargain"
with Congress over such legislation. Thus, the fact that the Chippewa did not
bargain with President Taylor over his 1850 executive order is utterly irrelevant to
whether the canons should be applied to it.
But wait, there's more! Rehnquist failed to follow the canons of
construction even with regard to the Chippewa treaties, where even he conceded
the canons should apply. He found that President Taylor was legally empowered
to remove the Chippewa from the lands ceded in 1837, based merely on alleged
implications in the 1837 treaty itself. 70 That treaty, as noted above, only ceded
ownership of the land, while preserving (subject to possible future presidential
termination) special Chippewa rights to hunt, fish, and gather on it. As Justice
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 262.
See id. at 265-81.
See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 215-17 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 214 n. 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 210-17 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
See Canby, supra n. 22, at 103-04.
See id. at 100-10.
See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 213-14 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
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O'Connor noted for the majority, "the revocation of [the 1837 Treaty] rights
would not have prevented the Chippewa from hunting, fishing, and gathering on
the ceded territory;... [it] would merely have subjected Chippewa hunters,
fishers, and gatherers to territorial, and later, state regulation. 1' 71 Rehnquist, by
contrast, assumed that simply because tribal property rights were ceded, and
special treaty usufructuary privileges were revoked (if indeed they were), the
Indians properly became.subject to forcible relocation to a distant territory. Yet
there are innumerable examples throughout American history where Indians
ceded tribal property rights and gave up (or never had) special treaty rights,
without becoming automatically subject to removal.
Pause for a moment to reflect on all this. Mille Lacs was far more than just
another twist in the long and winding road of Indian treaty litigation. It presented,
at the threshold of the twenty-first century, a truly stunning spectacle: the Chief
Justice of the United States-and one less than a majority of the United States
Supreme Court-strainingto interpret the language of an Indian treaty to provide
legal authority for Indian removal. Indian removal was, of course, a hallmark of
nineteenth-century America and one of the most horrific and genocidal policies in
United States history, apart from racial slavery. Not only that, the Chief Justice
and his majority-less-one strainedto uphold the legal validity and effectiveness of
an 1850 presidential Indian removal order that was abandoned by that president's
successor within three years, precisely because of the practical problems,
hardships, and injustices typical of Indian removal generally.
V.

2001: Two

CASES, ONE COURT,

No

JUSTICE

Chief Justice Yazzie's warning to Indian sovereignty advocates to "watch
your six ' ' 17 2 was never more apt than in May and June of 2001. In a quick one-two
punch, the Rehnquist Court got the Lone Wolf mentality off to a triumphal start

in the new millennium. First was Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley,173 decided
on May 29, 2001. Atkinson, written by the Grand Rehnquisitor himself,174 was sort
of like the TNT trigger for the A-bomb of Nevada v. Hicks,175 decided on June 25,
2001. Both cases involved the extent of tribal civil (rather than criminal)
jurisdiction over non-Indians engaged in activities within a reservation.

The issue in Atkinson was whether the Navajo Nation could impose a hotel
occupancy tax on nonmember guests at a hotel operated by a nonmember-owned

company on nonmember-owned land within the reservation. 176 The ownership
status of land within an Indian reservation had become especially critical (or so it

171. Id. at 192.
172. See Yazzie, supra n. 30.
173. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
174. Rehnquist reportedly "thought it funny that there was a Rehnquist Club at Harvard Law School
in which the leader was called the 'Grand Rehnquisitor,'. and a weekly discussion . . . the
'Rehnquisition."' Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court 412
(Simon & Schuster 1979).
175. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
176. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 647-48.
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seemed) because of the Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States.177
Montana involved the hunting and fishing rights of non-Indians within the Crow
Reservation, on land owned both by such non-Indians and by the tribe. To avert
any primal screams of confusion at this point from non-specialists in Indian law, it
may briefly be noted that a substantial amount of land within many Indian
reservations is now owned in fee simple by non-Indian residents of such
reservations. This is a product of the "allotment era" that'started in 1887 and
lasted until the 1920s, during which large tracts of tribal land were "allotted" into
small parcels deeded to individual Indians, which eventually (in many cases)
passed to non-Indian ownership. Large amounts of "surplus" tribal land were also
opened to non-Indian settlement, resulting in the loss of about two-thirds of the
total tribal land base in the lower forty-eight states. 178
Montana seemed to set forth two different rules regarding inherent tribal
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians (or nonmembers of the tribe). First, in the
introduction to Part III of its opinion, the Montana Court "readily agree[d]" that
the tribe could regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on tribally-owned land. 171
"What remains," the Court then stated, "is the question of the power of the Tribe
to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by
nonmembers .... ,0 Six pages later, in Part Ill.B, the Montana Court discussed
whether the tribe retained inherent "power to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation ....

181

Relying in part on

Oliphant's rejection of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court
stated a "general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe
82
do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.",
It has been hotly debated ever since whether this "general proposition"known to Indian law aficionados as the "Montana rule"-was meant to be
"general" as to all nonmembers, or only as to nonmembers when on nonmemberowned land. The explicit language quoted above, and the repeated references to
nonmember-owned "fee" land in the remainder of Section III.B of the opinion,
support the latter view.8 3 In any event, however broad the Montana rule was, is,
or should be, it is clear that-like Oliphant itself-it reversed the time-honored
presumption in favor of inherent Indian sovereignty. Montana marked the
infection of the tribal civil jurisdiction field with the Lone Wolf mentality. As we
shall see, the infection may yet prove fatal.
However, the Montana Court hastened to make clear that the Montana
rule-unlike the Oliphant rule-is not absolute. Rather, there are two broad
exceptions to the general presumption against inherent tribal civil jurisdiction over
177. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
178. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1995).
179. Mont., 450 U.S. at 557.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 563.
182. Id. at 565. It is important to note that this "Montana rule" was never meant to apply to tribal
treaty-based powers, which were also at issue in Montana. See id. at 557-63.
183. See id. at 563-67.
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nonmembers. Or at least they sound broad. The first Montana exception is that a
tribe may "regulate... the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements. ' , 18 4 The second Montana exception is that a tribe
may regulate "the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the
political integrity, the
85
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.'1
Montana itself suggested how narrowly the exceptions to the Montana rule
would be construed. One might think that a nonmember engages in a
"consensual" relationship with a tribe simply by choosing to own and reside on
land within an Indian reservation. And almost any kind of land use by such
property owners arguably has some potential impact on the economy or
environment of the tribe. That is the general basis on which most local
governments exercise zoning and other regulatory powers. But the Court in
Montana itself rejected the Crow Tribe's power to regulate
hunting and fishing by
.. 186
non-Indians on land they owned within the reservation.
Yet, since wildlife
crosses property lines all the time, hunting and fishing anywhere within an Indian
reservation could easily affect the environmental health of the entire reservation.
Anyway, getting back to our story in 2001: The Atkinson Court applied the
Montana rule and unanimously struck down the Navajo tax.18' And although
Atkinson itself involved nonmember-owned land, it contained a foreboding
portent. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, wrote
a concurring opinion declaring that the Montana rule should apply "regardless of
whether the land at issue is [nonmember-owned] fee land, or land owned by or
held in trust for an Indian tribe. 188
Souter's concurrence turned out to be an early warning tremor. The "Big
One" hit less than a month later when Hicks was decided. Justice Scalia, one of
Rehnquist's acolytes in Mille Lacs, wrote the majority opinion, joined in full by
Rehnquist, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and (most disappointingly) Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg."8 ' Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and

184. Id. at 565.
185. Id. at 566.
186. See id. at 566-67.
187. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 649-59. Atkinson is the latest in a string of cases expanding the Montana
rule, and narrowing the Montana exceptions, with regard to reservation lands owned or controlled by
nonmembers. See e.g. Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (rejecting tribal power to
zone most nonmember-owned property within reservation); Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (rejecting tribal-court jurisdiction over civil lawsuit against non-Indian arising on state highway
within reservation but not subject to tribal control). Atkinson also improperly limited the inherent
taxing power of Indian tribes upheld in an important post-Montana case. See Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
188. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 660 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
189. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 354; see id. at 375-86 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Ginsburg's decision to join Scalia's opinion in full
was not that surprising, given that she wrote the unanimous opinion in Strate, see supra n. 187. But it
remains puzzling and bitterly disappointing that Ginsburg, generally regarded as the most progressive
member of the current Court (especially on issues affecting disadvantaged social groups), and probably
the most progressive Supreme Court appointee since President Lyndon B. Johnson chose Justice
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Stephen G. Breyer, wrote a "concurring" opinion that actually disagreed strongly
with much of Scalia's reasoning and on how the case should be handled on the
remand that all agreed was necessary.190 Indian law scholars will be debating
Hicks for generations. Some excellent commentary has already appeared. 191
Following are some of my preliminary thoughts.
Hicks held that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction over a civil lawsuit against
several Nevada state game wardens brought by Floyd Hicks, a member of the
Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes. 92 Hicks claimed the state officers violated his
rights while searching his home on tribal land within the Fallon reservation. He
was suspected of having killed a bighorn sheep off the reservation, in violation of
Nevada state law. The search was conducted jointly by state and tribal officers,
based on search warrants obtained from both a state court judge and a judge of
the Fallon Tribal Court. 93 Scalia claimed in a footnote that "[o]ur holding... is
limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing
state law," leaving "open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember
defendants in general.' ' 194 But he applied the Montana rule, despite the fact that
Hicks arose on tribally owned land, thus adopting the radical expansion of
Montana proposed by Souter in Atkinson.195 Even more importantly, Scalia and
the Hicks majority endorsed sweeping, "inherent" state power to enter Indian
reservations without tribal permission or regulation,96 whenever deemed necessary
by state officials to investigate or enforce state law.1

Strictly speaking, Hicks only involved the "adjudicative jurisdiction" of a
tribal court to hail a nonmember before it to face a civil lawsuit and potential
personal liability. That is among the most aggressive possible assertions of

Marshall in 1967, has been so insensitive to Indian claims. True, she provided one of the critical five
majority votes in Mille Lacs, but Hicks and other cases situate her (within Indian law) well to the right
of Reagan appointee O'Connor, Ford appointee Stevens, and Bush appointee Souter. For example, in
Okla. Tax Commn. v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), Ginsburg wrote the five-to-four majority

opinion (joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) upholding state power to tax a tribal
member's tribal income where the tribal member resided off the reservation, over the dissent of her
fellow Clinton appointee, Breyer (joined by Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter).
190. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 387-401 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Stevens also filed a separate opinion disagreeing with the majority's
conclusion that tribal courts lack jurisdiction to hear federal civil rights lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000). See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 401-04 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
191. See e.g. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuitof States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 267, 329-35 (2001); Alex Tallchief
Skibine, Making Sense Out of Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347 (2001).

192. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369.
193. Id. at 355-57.
194. Id. at 358 n. 2.
195. See id. at 357-65. The Atkinson Souter trio elaborated on their views in Hicks. See id. at 375-86
(Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring). But see id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(despite joining Scalia's opinion, claiming to "understand" that it did "not reach out definitively to
answer" whether Montana should be extended beyond the context presented in Hicks of nonmembers
who are also state officials). One can only describe Ginsburg as being in denial. And one of the most
sharply disappointing aspects of Hicks was Souter's unabashed embrace-even amplification-of the
offensive and illogical rationale of Oliphantand Duro. See id. at 383-85 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy
& Thomas, JJ., concurring).
196. Id. at 360-66.
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governmental authority, short of criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court has
never upheld a civil judgment in an Indian tribal court against an unconsenting
nonmember defendant.
Most tribal civil jurisdiction cases have involved
"regulatory jurisdiction" over matters like taxation, zoning, hunting, and fishing.
It has long been thought possible that tribal adjudicative jurisdiction may not
reach as far as tribal regulatory jurisdiction. Scalia noted that the Court could
avoid resolving in Hicks the issue whether tribal adjudicative jurisdiction is
equivalent to tribal regulatory jurisdiction, "if we determine that the Tribes in any
event lack legislative [i.e., regulatory] jurisdiction in this case."1 97
Scalia thus tried to make it sound as if he were cautiously deciding Hicks on
the narrowest ground possible. In fact, he was doing the exact opposite. By
framing the question that way, he positioned the Court to completely reject, as it
did, tribal adjudicative and regulatory jurisdiction over state officers purportedly
enforcing state law on the reservation. Scalia could just as easily have avoided the
issue whether tribal adjudicative jurisdiction equals tribal regulatory jurisdiction
by simply limiting his opinion to the precise and narrower issue actually presented
by Hicks. There was no need whatsoever for him to resolve the broader question
whether any tribal regulatory limits at all exist on state law enforcement conduct
within Indian country, as O'Connor pointed out.198
It would have been perfectly possible in Hicks to hold that the tribe lacked
adjudicative jurisdiction over the state officers, while maintaining (or at least
leaving open the possibility of) some tribal regulatory limits on state authority
within Indian country. It also would have been perfectly consistent with the
Court's own reasoning in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.199 At
first blush, of course, it may seem incongruous to suggest that regulatory power
could exist without the backup enforcement mechanism of adjudicative power.
And indeed, it would be a bothersome handicap. But a similar problem already
exists with regard to tribal regulatory and criminal jurisdiction. Most governments
back up their regulatory authority with the threat of criminal sanctions. Taxation,
for example, may be civilly enforced for the most part, but criminal penalties for
tax evasion are typically available if needed. Hunting regulations may be
primarily civil in nature, but hunting without a license might also be a criminal
misdemeanor. But ever since Oliphant, Indian tribes have had to implement

197. Id. at 358.
198. See id. at 397 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
199. 523 U.S. 751 (1998) (reaffirming tribal sovereign immunity, even with regard to off-reservation
commercial ventures). Interestingly, some of the Justices who have fallen prey most readily to the
Lone Wolf mentality were in the six-to-three majority in Kiowa. Kennedy wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer. Id. at 753-60. Stevens, joined by Thomas
and Ginsburg, dissented. Id. at 760-66. The explanation appears to be the Justices' overriding concern
with the separate but related issue of state sovereign immunity. Four of the six Justices in the Kiowa
majority (all but Souter and Breyer) were in the five-to-four majority in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla.,
517 U.S. 44, 47-76 (1996), which found states constitutionally immune from lawsuits by tribes. Two of
the three Kiowa dissenters (Stevens and Ginsburg) also dissented in the Seminole Tribe case. See id. at
76-100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100-85 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
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whatever civil authority they have over non-Indians without the fallback of
criminal sanctions.
The Kiowa Court noted that tribal sovereign immunity with regard to offreservation commercial ventures was entirely consistent with the fact "that a State
may have authority to tax or regulate tribal activities occurring within the State
but outside Indian country. To say substantive state laws apply to off-reservation
conduct ... is not to say that a tribe no longer enjoys immunity from suit.,'2°° The
Court noted that it has upheld state power to tax on-reservation tribal cigarette
sales to nonmembers, while denying states the power to bring a lawsuit against the
tribe to collect unpaid taxes. °1 By the same token, it would be perfectly possible
to hold, for example, that state officials must obtain some form of permission from
tribal officials before executing a search on the reservation, without necessarily
also allowing a tribal-court lawsuit against the state officials if they do not comply.
Other remedies, such as federal-court litigation, might be available (or fashioned
by Congress) to deal with conduct by state officials within Indian country violating
either tribal sovereignty or individual rights or both.
Some sort of compromise along these lines might have resolved many of the
concerns shared by all the Justices regarding state officers subjected to tribal-court
lawsuits. Such officers are, of course, ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity for
actions taken in the course of their official duties, if they acted in the good faith
belief that their conduct was lawful. As O'Connor noted, the Fallon Tribal Courts
failed to promptly address the officers' immunity claims. She argued that on
remand, instead of just dismissing the lawsuit as required under the majority's
reasoning, the lower federal court should itself address the immunity issue.' ° 2
Scalia scored some palpable hits in criticizing this part of O'Connor's opinion.
O'Connor was suggesting, in effect, that tribal courts could be denied jurisdiction
as a sort of punishment for not adequately addressing the immunity issue. But
federal courts must normally make an all-or-nothing decision as to whether tribal
courts have jurisdiction. If tribal courts do have jurisdiction, they would seem to
have authority to decide the immunity issue under tribal law. That could, in
theory, place state officials at the mercy of tribal courts." 3
Indeed, a general problem highlighted by Hicks, as noted by Justice Souter,
is that "there is no effective review mechanism in place" over tribal court
decisions.0 4 Tribal court judgments cannot be formally removed or appealed to
any state or federal court. The only (rather cumbersome) recourse for a tribalcourt defendant is to bring a separate lawsuit in federal court, seeking either a writ
of habeas corpus or a declaratory judgment that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction.
But Scalia and the Hicks majority pretermitted any compromise that might have

200. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 755 (citations omitted).
201. See id.
202. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 397-401 (O'Connor, J.. joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
203. See id. at 373-74.
204. Id. at 385 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
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addressed such issues. They cheerfully threw out the tribal-sovereignty baby with
the adjudicative-jurisdiction bathwater.
Scalia conceded that it was "not entirely clear" from the Court's past
decisions whether states had the legal authority "to enter a reservation.., for
[state law] enforcement purposes" without either tribal or federal permission.0 5
That was certainly an understatement. In fact, the prevailing assumption had long
been that state officials generally have little more authority within an Indian
reservation than they do outside their own state lines.20 6 Of course, law
enforcement officials have traditionally cooperated in cases reaching across
jurisdictional lines.
And state authorities have long exercised some law
enforcement powers within Indian country. 207
It appears likely that the Nevada state game wardens sought (and obtained
with no apparent difficulty) tribal-court approval and tribal-police cooperation for
the raid on Hicks' home, for the same reasons they would have sought the
approval and cooperation of California courts and police if Hicks had resided in
California. But under Scalia's reasoning, Nevada need never have bothered with a
tribal-court warrant, and need not have given tribal police the courtesy of so much
as a phone call to let them know a state raid would be carried out on the
reservation. As O'Connor pointed out, Hicks presented a model scenario of statetribal law enforcement cooperation.0 8 It was thus puzzling, at best, why Scalia and
the majority went out of their way to encourage states to unilaterally project their
power within Indian country. And it was nothing less than a gratuitous insult to
Indian nation law enforcement for Scalia to suggest that such state power was
necessary "to 'prevent [such areas] from becoming an asylum for fugitives from
justice.' 2 0 9
In any event, Scalia totally missed (or chose to ignore) the deeper issue of
Indian sovereignty. His claim that federal law might provide some redress for
state violations of individual Indian rights210 completely failed to address the
undermining of tribal governmental authority inherent in the unilateral assertion
of state power within tribal territory, against tribal members, on tribally owned
land. The only way in which federal law might protect tribal integrity in that sense
would be to maintain the very kind of rule that the Court rejected in Hicks: a rule
of respect for tribal sovereignty requiring some form of tribal permission or

205. Id. at 363.
206. See Canby, supra n. 22, at 165, 173, 247, 269.
207. The Court has long recognized state power to investigate and prosecute state-law crimes
committed within Indian country by non-Indians against other non-Indians, although that too was a
regrettable and ill-thought-out product of the Lone Wolf era. See e.g. U.S. v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1882).
208. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 397 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
209. Id. at 364 (quoting Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 533 (1885)).
210. See id. at 374.
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consultation before state authorities reach the long arm of state law enforcement
into Indian country.2
The bottom line is that Scalia and the Hicks majority do not view tribal
sovereignty as entitled to any dignity or respect even remotely similar to that
accorded to state sovereignty. The single most shocking statement in Scalia's
Hicks opinion is that state enforcement of state law within Indian tribal
boundaries "no more impairs the tribe's, self-government than federal
enforcement of federal law impairs state government., 212 This statement is
willfully hostile to the entire history, structure, and logic of American Indian law.
Federal enforcement of federal law obviously must take place almost entirely
within the boundaries of the states, since (with a few exceptions like the District of
Columbia and overseas territories) the states constitute the United States. Of
course federal law enforcement does not improperly "impair" state sovereignty,
because the states are constitutionally subordinate to federal law under the
Supremacy Clause. 2t 3 The states are mere components of the United States.
The Indian nations, by contrast, are most emphatically not mere components
of the states, nor are they legally subordinate to the states. Or at least, they were
not prior to Hicks. According to the "plenary power" doctrine, of course, the
tribes are mere components of the United States, and are, like the states, fully
subject to federal enforcement of federal law. That doctrine, as applied to Indian
nations, actually has a far more dubious historical and constitutional basis than the
explicit text of the Supremacy Clause applicable to the states.1 4 Scalia's statement
implied a mythical Supremacy Clause of his own invention, under which tribal law
is somehow trumped by state law. And to think that Scalia calls himself a
"textualist"! 21 5 In fact, of course, as established by Worcester 170 years ago and
almost unquestioned by the Court until Hicks itself, Indian sovereignty-as
rooted and recognized in federal law-is superior to and trumps state power under

the Supremacy Clause!
While Scalia's Hicks opinion bluntly dissed Indian sovereignty, O'Connor's
dissenting "concurrence" offered only the palest defense of it. While she criticized
some of the more obvious flaws in Scalia's opinion, she too (joined by Stevens and
211. Scalia argued that tribal "self-government" and "internal relations" were not implicated because
Hicks was, after all, accused of violating state law while off the reservation. Id. at 364; see id. at 361-66,
371. The state officers, he implied, would only have violated tribal sovereignty if they had sought to
investigate or punish Indian conduct originating on the reservation itself, and thus totally beyond the
reach of state law. But under this reasoning, Nevada state officials would be perfectly free to roam
about California carrying out raids and searches, and arresting criminal suspects, without even
consulting or seeking permission from California authorities, as long as the suspects being pursued
were accused of committing some crime in Nevada. According to Scalia's logic, this would not pose
any threat whatsoever to California's political integrity as a state or the security or welfare of its
citizens.
212. Id. at 364.
213. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2.
214. See e.g. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No FederalSupremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St.
L.J. 113 (2002).
215. See e.g. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:FederalCourts and the Law (Amy Gutmann
ed., Princeton U. Press 1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 862
(1989).
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Breyer) agreed that the Montana rule should be expanded to cover all tribal land,
and she offered far less in the way of justification. 216 The Justices now appear to
unanimously agree that tribal land ownership is at most a mere "factor" to be
considered in applying the Montana rule. O'Connor's main protest was that the
majority did not treat it as a sufficiently "important factor., 217 But given how
narrowly all the Justices (including O'Connor, Stevens, and Breyer) have
construed the Montana exceptions, that offered very little protection for Indian
sovereignty, even (now) on tribally owned lands.
One hardly knows whether to laugh or cry at seeing Montana described by
the Souter trio in Atkinson and then the O'Connor trio in Hicks as the only hope
for "coherence" in American Indian law.218 If that's true, then we are truly
beyond hope. Souter argued that expanding the Montana rule "serves sound
policy... [b]ecause land on Indian reservations constantly changes hands (from
tribes to nonmembers, from nonmembers to tribal members, and so on)," thus
rendering the original Montana rule "extraordinarily difficult to administer., 219 In
the first place, Souter didn't know what he was talking about. Property does not,
in fact, frequently change ownership in this fashion in Indian country. NonIndian-owned parcels do indeed form something of a "checkerboard" or "crazy
quilt" on some reservations. 22° But it was Montana itself that set us on the road to
"incoherence" by needlessly tying tribal power to the occasional crazy quilt of
land ownership in Indian country, and by expanding Oliphant's reversal of the
long-established presumption in favor of inherent Indian sovereignty.
A far wiser trio of Justices said all that needed to be said about Montana
some years ago in Brendale v. Yakima Indian Nation.2 1 "I find it evident," said
Justice Blackmun in Brendale (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall), "that
the [Montana] Court simply missed its usual way...., [I]t contains language flatly
inconsistent with.., prior decisions defining the scope of inherent tribal
jurisdiction., 222 Unfortunately, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall joined silently
in the relevant (unanimous) portion of the Montana opinion when it was issued.
Their dissent in Brendale came eight years too late., In the wake of Hicks, it is all
too clear that the Court has, indeed, lost its way.

216. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 388 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
217. Id. at 389 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (emphasis added).
218. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 659 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas; JJ., concurring); Hicks,
533 U.S. at 388 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens & Breyer, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
219. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 383 (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
220. See e.g. Janet McDonnell, The Dispossessionof the American Indian, 1887-1934, at 121 (Ind.U.
Press 1991).
221. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
222. Id. at 455 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
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VI. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?

The judicial outlook for American Indian law is bleak. With occasional
exceptions like Mille Lacs, and despite a handful of dissenters like Judge Canby
on the Ninth Circuit or Justice Kennard on the California Supreme Court, most
judges are no longer defending Indian sovereignty. There are often no dissenters
any more on the United States Supreme Court. Most judges seem intent on
tearing down the 170-year-old edifice crafted by the likes of Chief Justice Marshall
in Worcester, Justice Black in Williams, and Justice Blackmun in Sioux Nation.223
Indian nation judges like Chief Justice Yazzie of the Navajo Nation Supreme
Court struggle against this trend, but their most powerful allies, strangely enough,
are now the political branches of the federal and even some state governments.
Congress, after all, passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988, which
despite its flaws has opened the door to widespread Indian economic
development. 24 Congress has also passed legislation like the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978 (which state judges have often undermined),225 the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (declared toothless by the United States Supreme

Court in 1988),226 the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of
1990227 (mercifully free so far from interpretation by the United States Supreme
Court), the Duro Fix Act of 1990,228 and the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act Amendments of 1994 (overturning the United States Supreme Court's refusal
to protect Indian religious use of peyote).229
Modern United States Presidents from both major political parties, from
Nixon to Clinton, have generally supported maintaining, and even expanding,
Indian sovereignty. 23° Even President Reagan followed the general trend.
Reagan's Environmental Protection Agency, in 1984, became the first federal
agency in modern times to adopt a formal policy promoting government-togovernment dealings with Indian tribes, leading to the delegation of important

environmental enforcement powers to some tribes. 231 The jury is still out on
President George W. Bush. It is not reassuring that Secretary of the Interior Gale
223. See e.g. supra pt. V (discussing Atkinson and Hicks).
224. See supra pt. I and n. 19.
225. Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-1963 (2000)) ("ICWA"); see e.g. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. App. 1996) (following
judicially invented "existing Indian family" exception to ICWA).
226. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified in
relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000)) ("AIRFA"); see Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1988) (holding that AIRFA created no judicially enforceable right or cause
of action).
227. Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048
(1990) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000)).
228. See supra n. 122.
229. American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125
(1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a); see Or. Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882
(1990) (rejecting constitutional right to use peyote in Native American Church ceremony).
230. See e.g. David E. Wilkins, American Indian Politics and the American Political System 115-18
(Rowman & Littlefield 2002).
231. See Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7 Duke Envtl. L. &
Policy Forum 367, 369-70, 374-84, 387-91 (1997).
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Norton and former Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs Neal
McCaleb have been held in contempt of court for continued mismanagement of
Indian trust accounts (as were, to be fair, Clinton's Secretaries of the Interior and
the Treasury and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs). 32
State and local governments, and non-Indian people at the state and local
level, have historically been viewed with great trepidation by Indians. It has long
been a bitterly accurate clich6 that "the people of the states where [Indians] are
found are often their deadliest enemies., 233 This dates back most famously to the
expulsion of the Cherokee Nation by the state and people of Georgia in the
1830s. 234 And it is still true to some extent. But the California state legislature, in
recent years, has actually tried to correct decisions by California state judges
undermining the pro-Indian-sovereignty thrust of Congress' Indian Child Welfare
Act.2 35 And, as discussed in Part I, the overwhelmingly non-Indian people of
California have forged ahead where their leaders feared to tread, emphatically
endorsing the economic independence of California Indian tribes in a historic act
of atonement for the wrongs of the past.
A revival of government-to-government methods of addressing Indian
concerns, as advocated by many scholars, 6 seems clearly preferable to judicial
litigation. But renewed treaty-making or its equivalent will not be enough, and
Indians are wise not to rely on that approach alone. At the same time, and despite
the view of some that the two approaches are inconsistent,2 37 Indians have also
sought with increasing success to promote tribal sovereignty through the
American political process, as voters and campaigners.28 The Rehnquist Court
may have ushered in the twenty-first century by judicially reaffirming, in Atkinson
and Hicks, the Lone Wolf mentality that ushered in the twentieth century. But the
ultimate repudiation of Lone Wolf may depend upon the wisdom of the American
people, both Indian and non-Indian, and their elected governments, both tribal
and non-tribal.

232. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affg and remanding Cobell v. Babbitt, 91
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)), on remand, 2002 WL 31060187 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2002) (holding Bush
officials in civil contempt); Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (same as to Clinton
officials). McCaleb recently resigned after less than two years on the job, apparently frustrated over
the administration's handling of Indian affairs. See Jim Adams, Departure of BIA Head Could Leave
Indians at Disadvantage, Indian Country Today (Dec. 2, 2002).
233. U.S.v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,384 (1886).
234. See e.g. Samuel Carter III, Cherokee Sunset: A Nation Betrayed (Doubleday 1976); John Ehle,
Trail of Tears: The Rise and Fall of the Cherokee Nation (Doubleday 1988).
235. See 1999 Cal. Stats. 275 (A.B. 65) (codified at Cal. Welt. & Inst. Code § 360.6).
236. See e.g. Clinton, supra n. 214; Porter, supra n. 10; Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in
Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order, 72
Wash. L. Rev. 1063 (1997).
237. See e.g. Porter, supra n. 10.
238. See e.g. LaVelle, supra n. 10; David E. Wilkins, An Inquiry into Indigenous Political
Participation: Implications for Tribal Sovereignty, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 732 (2000).
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